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CROWN ESTATE DEVOLUTION 
Aileen McHarg* 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One of the ^ŵŝƚŚ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛmore significant recommendations was that responsibility for 
managing the Crown Estate in Scotland, and the revenue generated from it, should be transferred to 
the Scottish Parliament.1 The Crown Estate is currently managed on a UK-wide basis by the Crown 
Estate Commissioners under the Crown Estate Act 1961  ? “ ? ?. Its origins date back to 1760, when 
George III surrendered the revenues from Crown lands to Parliament in return for support via the 
Civil List, an arrangement confirmed by each subsequent Monarch. Today, the Crown Estate consists 
of a mixture of hereditary Crown property rights, more recent rights vested in the Crown by statute, 
and modern property acquisitions. It does not comprise the entirety of Crown property rights, nor is 
it the personal property of the Sovereign. It is, in effect, a publicly-owned property business, the 
revenues from which accrue to the UK Treasury.   
 The CroǁŶƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŚŽůĚŝŶŐƐŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚĂƌĞůĞŐĂůůǇand historically distinct, having not been 
surrendered until 1830, and brought under common management by the Crown Lands Act 1833. 
They include: a small amount of urban and commercial property; several large rural estates; rights to 
salmon fishing, gold, silver and other reserved minerals; internal waterways; and  ? most significantly 
 ? the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ŵĂƌŝŶĞĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?. The latter includes around 50% of the foreshore, and almost all the 
ƐĞĂďĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ƚĞƌƌitorial waters, including aquaculture and mooring rights. The Crown 
Estate also exercises rights over the seabed and subsoil in the UK continental shelf, including 
minerals other than coal and hydrocarbons,2 and has been granted rights over offshore renewable 
energy production3 and gas storage.4 In 2013/14 ?ƚŚĞƌŽǁŶƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚŚŽůĚŝŶŐƐǁĞƌĞǁŽƌƚŚ
£267 million and generated £13.6 million gross revenue.5 
 Securing agreement to devolve the Crown Estate was a significant victory for the Scottish 
Government. In 2009, the Calman Commission had rejected its argument for devolution,6 and an 
attempt to amend what became the Scotland Act 2012 was also unsuccessful.7 However, the case 
for devolution was subsequently strengthened by the publication of several reports critical of the 
operation of the Crown Estate in Scotland.8 Particularly important was the highly effective campaign 
by ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ŝƐůĂŶĚƐ ĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ arguing for control over the 
                                                          
* Professor of Public Law, University of Strathclyde. 
1 Report of the Smith Commission for Further Devolution of Powers to the Scottish Parliament (2014) para 32. 
2 Continental Shelf Act 1964 s 1. 
3 Energy Act 2004 s 84. 
4 Energy Act 2008 s 1. 
5 The Crown Estate, Scotland Report 2014, available at: 
http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/300060/scotland-report-2014.pdf  
6 Commission on Scottish Devolution, Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st 
Century (2009) paras 5.110  ? 5.122. 
7 Marine Scotland, Scotland Bill  ? Crown Estate (Scottish Government, 2011). 
8 House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee, The Crown Estate in Scotland, 7th Report 2010-12, HC 1117; 
The Crown Estate in Scotland  ? Follow Up, 5th Report 2013-14, HC 889; Land Reform Review Group, The Land of 
Scotland and the Common Good (2014) ch 11. 
2 
 
marine estate,9 something which required the prior transfer of control to the Scottish Parliament. 
Indeed, the Smith Commission specifically recommended that there should be further devolution to 
council level following devolution to Holyrood.10 
 However, when the UK Government published its draft clauses in January 2015,11 the 
complex approach taken to Crown Estate devolution caused some consternation, with the Scottish 
Government alleging that it did not fulfil the spirit of Smith ?Ɛ recommendation.12 Nevertheless, 
despite attempts by the Scottish Government and others to secure changes, the clause survived 
largely intact, with only minor, clarificatory amendments made by the UK Government. Some 
aspects of what became section 36 of the Scotland Act 2016 came into force immediately upon 
Royal Assent,13 but completion of the devolution process depends upon agreement between the 
Scottish and UK Governments of a transfer scheme and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), 
neither of which had been concluded at the time of writing.   
 The remainder of this note briefly considers the arguments for and against Crown Estate 
devolution, the Scotland Act provisions, and the likely future of the Crown Estate in Scotland. It 
argues that, while the case for devolution may have been won in principle, the objections to it 
clearly continued to shape the h< 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛapproach to devolution, and will constrain the 
exercise of the devolved powers in practice.   
B. THE CASE FOR DEVOLUTION 
The case for devolution of the Crown Estate is essentially twofold.14 First, there is no clear rationale 
for the current division between reserved and devolved competences. For one thing, some Crown 
property is already devolved, and the Scottish Parliament also controls the definition of Crown 
property rights at common law. More importantly, most policy responsibilities relevant to the 
administration of the Crown Estate in Scotland are also devolved. In the energy field, for instance, 
the Crown Estate has an important planning role in relation to the siting of renewable energy and 
storage installations, as well as cables and pipelines, through seabed leasing. However, the Scottish 
Government has the lead role on promotion of renewables, and also controls marine licensing15 and 
some energy consents.16 This division of responsibilities is cumbersome, costly and potentially 
confusing for developers, and there is a risk of conflict between the leasing and regulatory regimes. 
                                                          
9 Our Islands  ? Our Future, Constitutional Change in Scotland  ? Opportunities for Islands Areas (2013), available 
at: http://www.shetland.gov.uk/OIOF/documents/ourislands-ourfuture-JointPositionStatement-
17june2013.pdf.  
10 Smith Commission, n 1, at para 33. 
11 HM Government, Scotland in the United Kingdom: An Enduring Settlement, Cm 8990 (2015). 
12 See, eg, ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚWƌĞƐƐZĞůĞĂƐĞ ? ‘ƌŽǁŶƐƚĂƚĞĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? 
13 S 36(1), (5), (6) and (9) to (12). 
14 See Scottish Government, Administration of the Crown Estate in Scotland  ? Case for Change (2011); Marine 
Scotland, n 7; and references in n 8 above. 
15 Marine licensing within Scottish territorial waters is governed by the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010; outwith 
territorial waters it is governed by the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, but is executively devolved to the 
Scottish Ministers. 
16 Consents to offshore generating stations and power lines under the Electricity Act 1989 ss 36 and 37 are 
executively devolved. Licensing and permitting of energy storage facilities under the Energy Act 2008 Pt 1 is 
shared between the UK and Scottish Governments. Pipeline consents are governed by the Petroleum Act 1998 
Pt 3, and are reserved. 
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 Secondly, there is long-standing dissatisfaction with the operation of the Crown Estate in 
Scotland. Its statutory duty is to maintain the Crown Estate  “ĂƐĂŶĞƐƚĂƚĞŝŶůĂŶĚ ? ?ƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂŶĚ
enhance its value and the return obtained from it, but with due regard to the requirements of good 
management. ?17 This is interpreted to mean that it should act as a commercial property business, 
aiming to maximise revenues, subject to requirements of integrity and good stewardship,18 but 
prohibited from taking account of wider policy objectives. This commercial rather than 
governmental conception of its role leads, critics claim, to a lack of transparency, accountability and 
public participation in its decision-making, and a lack of communication and engagement with key 
stakeholders and local communities. Here, the case for devolution ties into the broader land reform 
agenda, with the desire to secure greater community control over land use and revenues, and to 
ensure that land is used sustainably for the common good. 
C. THE CASE AGAINST DEVOLUTION 
Objections to devolution centre around the desire to maintain the integrity of the Crown Estate, and 
the need to protect reserved policy interests. Regarding the former, certain Conservative MPs 
argued during debates on the Scotland Bill that devolution was inappropriate because, due to the 
unity of the Scots and English Crowns, the Crown Estate is indivisible.19 This argument is legally and 
historically inaccurate, and ignores the contemporary reality that the particular mix of Crown assets 
encompassed within the Crown Estate is essentially haphazard. It is also worth stressing that 
devolution of the management of the Crown estate does not alter the ownership of the assets 
themselves, though this begs the question why it is necessary to maintain a Crown property 
portfolio at all.20 While, calculation of the Sovereign Grant is pegged to Crown Estate revenues,21 this 
is merely a proxy rather than an actual cash transfer, and is an arrangement of no great antiquity. 
 The second concern is that a devolved Crown Estate might, though its land-use decisions or 
by charging excessive rents, compromise UK-wide critical national infrastructure in areas such as 
defence, security, energy and telecommunications, or impose undue costs on taxpayers and 
consumers elsewhere in the UK. This is more justifiable, though it is questionable whether these 
interests are any safer under the current arrangement whereby the Crown Estate exercises its 
monopoly powers purely for commercial gain. While ministers can give directions to the 
Commissioners,22 these powers are regarded as exceptional and have never been used; something 
the Treasury Select Committee strongly criticised in 2010.23 Nevertheless, the Smith Commission 
recommended that the Scottish and UK Governments should agree an MoU to ensure that 
devolution is not detrimental to critical infrastructure, and to safeguard the defence and security 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŽǁŶƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĨŽƌĞƐŚŽƌĞĂŶĚƐĞĂďĞĚĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?24 
D. THE SCOTLAND ACT 2016 
                                                          
17 CEA s 1(3). 
18 See http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/who-we-are/our-values/.  
19 See Jacob Rees-Mogg and Dominic Grieve, HC Deb, 6 June 2015, cols 77  ? 85, 90  ? 93.  
20 This is not to deny the strong case for maintaining certain assets, such as the seabed, in public ownership.  
21 Sovereign Grant Act 2011. 
22 Crown Estate Act 1961 s 4. 
23 House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Management of the Crown Estate, 8th Report 2009  ? 10, HC 
325, paras 118  ? 122. 
24 Smith Commission, n 1, at para 34. 
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Section 36 does three main things. First, subsection (1) inserts a new section 90B into the Scotland 
Act 1998  ? “^ ? ? ? ? ? ?, which enables the Treasury, with the ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ?consent,25 to make a 
scheme  ? “ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ? ?transferring all the ƌŽǁŶƐƚĂƚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ?existing Scottish 
functions to the Scottish Ministers or a person nominated by them  ? “ƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌĞĞ ? ?. As an interim 
measure, subsection (7) applies the CEA to the transferee, but subject to the power in subsections 
(8) to (12) for the Scottish Ministers to make provision by Order in Council in advance of the transfer 
for the exercise by the transferee of its functions, including establishing a new body. Second, 
subsections (2) to (4) amend Schedule 5 Part 1 of the SA 1998 to limit the reservation of the Crown 
Estate ƚŽ  “ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌŽǁŶ ƐƚĂƚĞ
CommiƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ?, thereby enabling the Scottish Parliament to legislate for the future management of 
the transferred functions. Third, subsection (13) amends the Civil List Act 1952 to provide for 
payment of Scottish Crown Estate revenues into the Scottish Consolidated Fund. 
 The transfer scheme was the most controversial aspect of section 36. It was justified as 
being necessary to transfer executive as well as legislative powers over the Crown Estate26 and to 
clarify the precise rights and liabilities being transferred.27 However, while establishing separate 
administrative arrangements for the Scottish assets immediately upon devolution might be 
convenient, it clearly was not necessary. A simple amendment of Schedule 5 Part 1 of the SA 1998 
would have automatically devolved ministerial functions over the Crown Estate Commissioners28 and 
enabled the Scottish Parliament to decide how and by whom their Scottish responsibilities should be 
exercised in future.   
 The transfer scheme model also has some important implications. First, not all Crown Estate 
assets in Scotland will be included in the scheme. The lucrative Fort Kinnaird shopping centre, which 
is owned by an English Limited Partnership in which the Crown Estate has an interest, is excluded.29 
Moreover, the Crown Estate Commissioners are still permitted to make commercial investments in 
Scotland, and the management of such assets will remain reserved.30 
 Secondly, section 90B constrains the future management of the transferred assets. They 
must continue to be managed on behalf of the Crown and must be maintained as an estate (or 
estates) in land.31 While the new manager can alter the pool of assets within the transferred estate, 
a Crown property portfolio must continue to exist in perpetuity,32 and Holyrood will be unable to 
alter these requirements.33 Further, the transfer scheme must include such provision as the Treasury 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ  “ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇor expedient ? (emphasis added) to protect defence and national security, 
telecommunications and energy infrastructure, and the interests of electricity consumers.34 The 
draft transfer scheme published in October 2015 contained extremely detailed powers of 
intervention for the UK Government, going far beyond the directive powers in the CEA, and 
                                                          
25 S 90B(17) SA 1998. 
26 David Mundell, HC Deb, 6 June 2015, col 117. 
27 HM Government, n 11, at para 5.5.4. 
28 See Sch 5, Pt, para 2(1)(b) SA 1998. 
29 S 90B(3) SA 1998. 
30 HM Government, n 11, at para 5.5.2. 
31 S 90B (5) and (8) SA 1998 
32 Lord Dunlop, HL Deb, 19 January 2016, col 669. 
33 S 36(4) SA 2016. 
34 S 90B(12) SA 1998. 
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overlapping substantially with the draft MoU.35 Whether these will survive in the final scheme is 
unclear, but the important point again is that the Scottish Parliament will be unable to alter them.36 
It ǁŝůůĂůƐŽďĞƵŶĂďůĞƚŽĂůƚĞƌƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚŽĨƌŽǁŶƐƚĂƚĞƌĞǀĞŶƵĞƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞ “ŚĞƌĞĚŝƚĂƌǇƌĞǀĞŶƵĞƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞƌŽǁŶ ?ƌĞŵĂŝŶƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?37  
 In view of these constraints, a final problem with the transfer scheme model is its lack of 
transparency and appropriate scrutiny. The detailed provisions are for negotiation between the 
Scottish and UK Governments, and while the implementing statutory instrument will be subject to 
affirmative resolution in both Houses of Parliament,38 there is no role for the Scottish Parliament in 
its enactment or amendment. 
E. THE FUTURE OF THE CROWN ESTATE IN SCOTLAND 
The future of the Crown Estate in Scotland is, at the time of writing, uncertain. The Scottish 
Government is proposing to establish, via Order in Council, an independent statutory corporation, to 
be named Crown Estate Scotland (Interim Management), has stated that a single entity will to 
manage the assets in the short term, and  ? whether the Scottish Ministers or a new or existing 
independent body is not clear  ? but will consult further in due course over new primary legislation to 
establish longer-term arrangements.3940 Eventual rReforms are likely to include ensuring that 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚ ĂƐƐĞƚƐ  “ŝƐ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ƚŽ ďƌŽĂĚĞƌ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ
benefit and commuŶŝƚǇ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞ ƌĂŝƐŝŶŐ ? ?41 plus giving islands and other 
coastal councils a role in managing marine assets and ensuring that they benefit from the revenue 
from marine activities within territorial waters.42 There remains a political consensus in favour of a 
role for local authorities,43 although proposed amendments to the Scotland Bill to force such 
 “ĚŽƵďůĞ ĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ǁĞƌĞ ƌĞƐŝƐƚĞĚ ďǇ ďŽƚŚ ƚŚĞ h< ĂŶĚ ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ? ƚŚĞ
constraints imposed by section 36 may limit the radicalism of any potential changes in this regard. 
                                                          
35 Available at: http://www.parliament.scot/Papers_20151119.pdf.  
36 S  ? ? ? ? ? ?^ ? ? ? ? P “ŶǇƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌďǇƚŚĞƐĐŚĞŵĞŝƐƐƵďũ ĐƚƚŽĂŶǇƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƵďƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ(12) ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
Parliament has no competence to amend s90B. 
37 Sch 5, Pt 1, para 3(3)(a) SA 1998. 
38 S 36(5) SA 2016. 
39 Marine Scotland, Crown Estate  ? Consultation on Proposals for Establishing the Interim Body to Manage the 
Crown Estate Assets in Scotland Post-Devolution (June 2016), available at: 
https://consult.scotland.gov.uk/crown-estate-strategy-unit/manage-the-crown-estate-assets. 
40 Scottish Government, Interim Management of Crown Estate Assets (SAGCE 4/2016), available at: 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/marine/seamanagement/TCE/AdvisoryGroup/13012016Papers. 
41 Scottish Government, The Crown Estate  ? Current Scottish Government Policy (SAGCE 6/2015), available at: 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/marine/seamanagement/TCE/AdvisoryGroup/SeptMins. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Other interest groups may, however, be opposed  ? see Devolution (Further Powers) Committee, New 
Powers for Scotland  ? Ŷ/ŶƚĞƌŝŵZĞƉŽƌƚŽŶƚŚĞ^ŵŝƚŚŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞh<'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐWƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ, SP 
Paper 720, 3rd Report, Session 4 (2015) para 387. 
